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Democracy at a disadvantage? 
British rearmament, the shadow factory scheme and the coming of war, 
1936-40. 
By Neil Forbes (Coventry) 
Armament production and the Second World War 
Among the vast historical literature on the Second World War, a number of studies have tried 
to identify the unique features of different national economies which may help to explain 
why the wartime economic performance of a particular country was above- or below-average 
from an international perspective. In the case of the production of war materiel, rearmament 
in the 1930s laid down a basis for a greatly expanded output during wartime. Germany, es-
pecially, created a Wehrwirtschaft – a war economy during peacetime. In contrast, British 
rearmament had to keep step with public opinion which was only slowly relinquishing hopes 
of collective security. Indeed, those closely involved in preparing the nation for war became 
increasingly anxious at how far and how fast Britain appeared to be falling behind Germany.1 
At the centre of debates over the perceived deficiencies in Britain’s rearmament programme 
was the question of whether, in comparison to what was possible under the coercive power 
of a dictatorship, a democracy would always and inevitably be at a disadvantage. However, 
though the dangers were hardly exaggerated, historians have pointed out that, by 1939, Britain 
was out-producing Nazi Germany in tanks and aircraft.2 This certainly calls into question 
conventional interpretations of the national narrative which emphasise decline and failure. 
An alternative view – that Britain was a state organised around the successful prosecution  
of war – has been recently advanced. According to Edgerton, Britain witnessed ‘exceptional 
mobilisation’ with the coming of the Second World War; with a concentration on the pro-
duction of weapons, ‘liberal militarism’ is said to have been a key characteristic of the state.3 
This essay considers the role of shadow factories in rearmament. Owned by the state but built 
and operated by private-sector firms, these factories were established, concurrently, in Britain 
and Germany from the mid-1930s. Shadow production schemes were to become an important 
building block in the structure of several war economies. Britain’s key shadow industry was 
the construction of aircraft for the Royal Air Force; the analysis here focuses, therefore, on 
the production of aero engines for bomber aircraft in the last years of peace and the early 
stages of the Second World War. The intention, thereby, is to test assumptions concerning 
Britain’s readiness for war and to consider whether, in pursuing this vital aspect of the arms 
race, the advantage lay with liberal, democratic Britain or the National Socialist dictatorship. 
The institutional and organisational context within which armaments are produced may be 
highly significant: ideological or political factors may act either to constrain or facilitate 
industrial production and technological innovation, whilst military, business and scientific 
                                                          
1  For a recent, authoritative study see, J. Maiolo, Cry Havoc. The Arms Race and the Second World War, 
1931-1941, London 2011, pp. 142 f. 
2  See, for example, R.J. Overy, Why the Allies Won, London 1996, p. 12. 
3  D. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine. Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War, 
London 2011, pp. 1-7. 
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elites exercise varying degrees of power and influence within a state. At the beginning of the 
Second World War, for example, it is argued that the comparatively low productivity in 
German armament production was caused by the dominance of military authorities over the 
civilian administration when it came to the procurement of armament goods. As Richard 
Overy has commented, procurement processes were carried out with virtually no co-operation 
between the armed services and scant attention to either rational production methods or the 
problems of the industrial economy.4 
In the US, too, civilian mobilization agencies were overruled by the armed forces. Cullen 
and Fishback suggest that: “The military decided where contracts were allocated with little 
inference from the War Production Board. Economic problems in counties received virtually 
no systematic consideration in distributing funds [...].”5 But, in contrast to the German case, 
the dominance of military authorities in the American war economy appeared to increase 
rather than slow down the velocity of armament production. Clearly, if the validity of both 
interpretations is to be sustained, it is necessary to understand the precise role of the military 
in procurement in the national economies of combatants in the Second World War. 
More generally, it might be misleading to make a sharp distinction between the market-
oriented economies of the Western Allies and the centrally-planned economies of Russia and 
the Axis powers. Certainly, under the conditions of total war, the ideological distinction 
between democracy and dictatorship became much less obvious: the British state took emer-
gency powers that imposed sweeping controls, whilst the Nazi regime attempted to maintain 
a certain level of normality in everyday life and to work together with private enterprise. It is 
perhaps reasonable to assume, therefore, that the requirements of fighting a material-intensive, 
global conflict led all warring countries to build up the same type of modern war economy, 
despite insurmountable ideological differences. 
But this also appears to have been the case with the response to a specific problem con-
fronting states as they re-structured their economies in order to prepare for war. During 
peacetime, some armament goods deemed surplus to requirements could be channelled into 
export trades; but it was not possible to dispose of mass-produced armaments profitably. It 
was necessary, therefore, to find a way in peacetime not only to produce armaments and 
synthetic products but also to lay down the capacity to satisfy, in the event of war, an highly 
uncertain level of future demand. Both Britain and Germany were driven by the need, in the 
mid-1930s, to achieve this political objective. Notwithstanding the contrasting ideological 
position of the two states, they came up with the same institutional solution at the same time: 
additional capacity would be provided by setting up shadow factories. 
In seeking to develop a shadow capacity, both British and German governments encoun-
tered several, major complications which made the implementation of any scheme far from 
straightforward. Apart from the risk-aversion of private firms, these complications included 
decisions over whether the building-up of new armament plants should be disguised or con-
cealed in some fashion from domestic or foreign observers, the choice of locations which 
were considered either less vulnerable to attack from the air or feasible from an economic  
 
                                                          
4  R.J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford 1994, p. 347. 
5  J. Cullen/P. Fishback, Did Big Government’s Largesse Help the Locals? The Implications of WWII 
Spending for Local Economic Activity, 1939-1958 (Working Paper NBER W12801, 2006), p. 8. 
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perspective or a compromise between these two factors, the reaction of the local population 
to new armament plants and, last but not least, the utilization of the technological know-how 
of the established armament and engineering firms. It is in this context, therefore, that this 
essay re-examines the reasoning behind what was planned in Britain from the mid-1930s, the 
influence of democratic discourse on military strategising, how efficiently the shadow scheme 
was put into practice, and how effective it proved to be once war had broken out. Where 
possible, points of comparison are drawn with the shadow factory scheme that was set up 
concurrently in the Third Reich. 
Strategy, armaments and risk-averse manufacturers 
In the case of the Third Reich, several studies have analysed the relationship between arma-
ments production and the industrial structure.6 By the mid-1930s the Nazi government planned 
and promoted a considerable increase in investment by private firms in the armament industries 
and in autarky – the drive to achieve self-sufficiency in strategically-important raw materials 
by developing industrial capacity, especially in manufacturing synthetic products. Scherner 
shows that instead of using coercion to enforce investment schemes, the government, in 
general, tried to attain the voluntary cooperation of firms by offering a set of different 
investment contracts. Private investors could then choose the contract type that suited their 
own economic objectives best.7 Firms did not want to risk investing in unprofitable, excess 
capacity and therefore based their choice of contract primarily on their expectations about 
the return on the respective investment. 
Scherner distinguishes between short-run and long-run expectations. In the short run it was 
assumed that the Nazis would stick to policies of autarky and armament by means of price 
controls, rationing, re-allocation of labour and raw materials, protectionism and foreign-
exchange control. German firms believed that such controls would last only for a transitional 
period; in the long run, they expected a return to a functioning and internationally-open 
market economy.8 When firms expected that a particular investment project promoted by the 
government would be profitable, regardless of the timescale, they were clearly interested in 
owning new plant and were, therefore, willing to finance it completely themselves. Alterna-
tively, firms could choose a risk-sharing contract by which the government committed itself 
to finance a part of the investment project. In return, firms had to grant the government some 
control rights and co-determination. Many of the plants for the German synthetic fibre and 
synthetic rubber industry were constructed using these risk-sharing contracts. 
                                                          
6  See, for example, J. Scherner, Nazi Germany’s Preparation for War. Evidence from Revised Industrial 
Investment Series, in: European Economic History Review 14, 2010, pp. 433-468, here p. 457; also, 
Overy, War and Economy, p. 245. Overy concentrates on state-owned and state-operated firms like the 
Reichswerke Hermann Göring. See also, A. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Break-
ing of the Nazi Economy, London 2006, p. 213. Tooze claims that the building-up of excess capacity in 
German peacetime armament production meant that war had to be contemplated not as an option but 
rather as an unavoidable economic consequence. 
7  J. Scherner, Investment Contracts between State Agencies and Industry in the Third Reich, in: C. Buch-
heim (Ed.), German Industry in the Nazi Period, Stuttgart 2008, pp. 117-131. 
8  For many historical examples that confirm this view see J. Scherner, Die Logik der Industriepolitik im 
Dritten Reich. Die Investitionen in die Autarkie- und Rüstungsindustrie und ihre staatliche Förderung, 
Stuttgart 2008. 
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Lease contracts were used, in Nazi Germany, for establishing so-called army-owned factories 
(Heereseigene Betriebe), including the armament industry's shadow factories.9 The public-
holding company Verwertgesellschaft für Montanindustrie GmbH (MONTAN), owned the 
factory premises and also financed the building-up of the new facilities with the help of army 
funds. Reputable manufacturers of armament goods like Deutsche Waffen- und Munitions-
fabriken AG, Rheinmetall Borsig or I.G. Farbenindustrie were charged with supervising and 
accomplishing the investment projects. After a factory was completed, MONTAN leased it to a 
newly-founded subsidiary of the armament manufacturer which had been responsible for the 
construction process. This subsidiary operated the factory and paid between a half and two-
thirds of its operating profits as rent to MONTAN.10 Consequently, with the help of such lease 
contracts, MONTAN could use the technological know-how and experience of the German 
armament manufacturers who were unwilling to invest in additional production capacity 
either by constructing the shadow factories before the war or by operating them during it. 
The question of how to reorganise armaments procurement in Britain was the catalyst for 
inviting Lord Weir, one of the leading industrialist-technocrats of the age, to take a position 
at the centre of decision-making. Weir had been Director of Munitions and President of the 
Air Council in the First World War, served on important committees in the 1920s, and en-
joyed especially close relations with leading political figures. As Hitler began to consolidate 
his power in Germany, Weir became preoccupied with the issues involved in organising an 
effective defence of Britain's vital national interests. He was invited, at the end of 1933, to 
meet members of the Committee of Imperial Defence. By February 1934, he had composed a 
long memorandum entitled “Some notes on British Policy in regard to National Defence, 
Peace and Disarmament”, and sent a copy to his friend, Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. Weir argued for nothing less than a wholesale restructuring of the CID 
apparatus. This was immediately followed up by another analysis, undertaken by Weir in 
conjunction with Sir Arthur Balfour (the steel manufacturer), and Sir James Lithgow (the 
shipbuilder) on “War Emergency Preparation”. This trio of leading industrialists detailed 
what would have to be done to mobilise industry for armaments production in general; they 
thought it would be expedient to ”make arrangements for the creation, at least on paper, of 
new shops and facilities operated by the firms”.11  
Immediately after making his report, Weir was requested to discuss informally with the CID 
how some constructive proposals might be initiated and, in March 1935, Stanley Baldwin – 
soon to be Prime Minister – also asked Weir to help Viscount Swinton (Philip Cunliffe-Lister) 
to develop a new programme for the Air Force. Weir was given the unassuming title of 
Adviser to the Air Ministry. Indeed, he was always quick to declare to anyone in or outside 
Whitehall that he acted in a purely advisory rather than in any governmental or executive 
capacity. But he was no ordinary industrial adviser: both the public in general and those 
                                                          
  9  See B. Hopmann, Von der MONTAN zur Industrieverwaltungsgesellschaft (IVG) 1916-1951. Stuttgart 
1996, p. 111, 117. 
10  Ibid., pp. 71-76. 
11  University of Glasgow Archive Services, William Douglas Weir collection (hereafter UG), GB0248 
DC96/21/3, letter from Secretary, CID, to Weir, 14 Dec.1933; GB0248 DC96/21/4, memos dated, re-
spectively, 13 Feb. and 26 March 1934. 
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inside government immediately grasped the significance of this appointment.12 As Weir told 
Baldwin, he was against doing anything that would turn industry upside down but felt that, 
“we must quietly but very rapidly find an effective British compromise solution as opposed 
to merely copying the centralised dictator system.”13 Within the Air Ministry, plans to establish 
a shadow industry for the wartime expansion of aircraft capacity had been drawn up in 1927.14 
But it is Weir who is credited with being the progenitor of the shadow factory scheme. 
The antecedents of the shadow scheme in Britain can be traced to the establishment of 
agency factories in the First World War. In state-industry relations the scheme demonstrated 
the ideological complexion of the British government by exemplifying a traditional preference 
for entrepreneurship.15 This seems to have extended to a belief on the part of the government 
that the employers concerned would find it easier to shut the factories when demand for 
armaments fell.16 It is certainly the case that this approach to rearmament appealed to the 
Conservative-dominated National Government: a shadow scheme was a way for the state to 
pay and own munitions factories that would, it was believed, be built and operated more 
efficiently by the private sector. But, just as in Germany, so too in Britain, a significant factor 
driving governmental policy was the knowledge that private armament manufacturers were 
intent on minimising the risk of investing in excess capacity.17 
The British scheme was also designed to take account of the existing, severe capacity-con-
straints in the engineering sector of the British economy. The alternatives to using the private-
sector – a state owned and operated armaments industry – would certainly have turned 
industry upside down. It would have required government to take powers to direct and control 
skilled labour and executive personnel; many feared that measures on such a scale would put 
the financial and economic stability of the country at risk.18 At the very least, it would have 
caused enormous resentment among employers. The scheme also provided a way to switch 
production, rapidly and comprehensively at the outbreak of war, away from civilian goods. 
Reflecting on Churchill’s criticisms in 1935 concerning the enfeebled condition of Britain’s 
defences, Weir posed the key question: “Are we doing all we ought to anticipate by proper 
planning and arrangement the grave delays which were the feature of our almost fatal 
unpreparedness in 1914?” Weir declared himself to be fully in sympathy with Churchill in 
                                                          
12  Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, UK, Lord Weir Papers (hereafter CAC, Weir), Weir 19/1, letter, 
20 May 1935, from Lord Londonderry (Secretary of State for Air) to Weir. Londonderry, referring to 
the great problems facing them, wrote: “Your name carries such weight and inspires such confidence in 
the country […]”. 
13  Quoted in, R.P. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, Princeton 1977, p. 94; see 
also, W.J. Reader, Architect of Air Power: The Life of the First Viscount Weir of Eastwood 1877-1959, 
London 1968. 
14  W. Hornby, Factories and Plant. History of the Second World War, London 1958, p. 24. 
15  D. Edgerton, Technical Innovation, Industrial Capacity and Efficiency. Public Ownership and the Brit-
ish Military Aircraft Industry, in: Business History 26, 1984, pp. 247-279 (here pp. 256 f.). 
16  D. Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: an Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation, Basingstoke 
1991, p. 75. 
17  H. Penrose, British Aviation: the Ominous Skies 1935-1939, London 1980, p. 175. 
18  CAC, Weir 19/2, note by Weir, 10 June 1936, “Acceleration of defence measures”. This note was drawn 
up after consulting Sir Thomas Inskip, the newly-appointed Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, and 
was circulated among ministries. 
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believing that little or nothing was being done.19 Thus Weir set himself the objective of 
pursuing the various alternative ways of increasing peacetime production and at the same 
time perfecting the arrangements for preparing for war.20 To Churchill, and doubtless to 
many others, these preparations were far from obvious. He asked Weir whether he was sure he 
was right to lend all his reputation to keeping the country in a state of comfortable peacetime 
routine.21 But Viscount Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air, told the Committee of Imperial 
Defence that by erecting factories and allowing the shadow firms to gain experience, the 
scheme was turning this war potential into an actual asset. The firms were engaged in 
estimating how far their civil plant would be useful for war work and the extent to which it 
would have to be supplemented by new machinery.22 As the international crisis developed, 
the ideological battle intensified. Reviewing the position in the wake of the Anschluss, Weir 
believed that Britain had to avoid any admission that Germany’s supposed super-efficiency 
in armament strength, “can only be secured by dictatorship rule. A democracy ought to be 
able to apply itself to these problems.”23 
Rearmament for Britain in the 1930s involved making decisions about where and how to 
allocate resources after weighing up a bewildering array of geo-strategic issues, risk factors 
and opportunity costs. In addition to the existing threats posed to British interests by Japa-
nese expansionism in the Far East, and Mussolini in the Mediterranean, German rearmament 
represented a new and growing danger. In March 1934, Baldwin promised the House of 
Commons that Britain would not accept in air power a position of inferiority to any country 
within striking distance of British shores. The deterrent of counter-bombing – specifically 
targeted against Germany – was considered the most likely guarantee of British security. The 
Air Ministry, therefore, drew up programmes that put emphasis not only on the production of 
heavy bombers but also on establishing deep reserves. The combined efforts of the Ministry 
and the aircraft industry to reorganise the manufacturing base were supported by the Treasury 
which prioritised these efforts, allowing the necessary industrial resources to be secured.24 
But, there were serious deficiencies and weaknesses in the performance of the British aircraft 
industry. The design of airframes was, for example, prioritised over production of aircraft in 
any quantity: most aircraft constructors comprised little more than teams of designers, with 
facilities for building some aircraft.25 Military strategists were especially concerned at the  
 
                                                          
19  CAC, Weir, 19/12, minute, 22 Aug. 1935, Weir to P. Cunliffe-Lister, (created Viscount Swinton), Secretary 
of State for Air. In correspondence with Churchill, Cunliffe-Lister described Weir as “an absolute  
God-send”. 
20  CAC, Weir, 19/2, minute, 30 Jan. 1936, Weir to Secretary of State. 
21  Weir 19/12, letter, 6 May 1936, Churchill to Weir. For a fuller analysis see, Maiolo, Cry Havoc, pp. 157 f. 
22  CAC, Weir, 19/2, minutes of C.I.D. meeting, 19 Nov. 1936. 
23  CAC, Weir, 19/18, note for talk with Secretary of State on 15 March 1938. 
24  See R.A.C. Parker, Struggle for Survival. The History of the Second World War, Oxford 1989, p. 50; 
G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939, Edinburgh 1979, p. 160; W.K. Hancock/ 
M.M. Gowing, British War Economy. History of the Second World War, London 1949, p. 66; M. Smith, 
British Air Strategy between the Wars, Oxford 1984. 
25  G. Stone, Rearmament, War and the Bristol Aeroplane Company, 1935-1945, in: C. Harvey/J. Press (Eds.), 
Studies in the Business History of Bristol, Bristol 1988, pp. 187-212; P.Fearon, Aircraft Manufacturing, 
in: N.K. Buxton/D.H. Aldcroft (Eds.), British Industry between the Wars. Instability and Industrial 
Development 1919-1939, London 1982, pp. 216-240. 
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apparent disparities between the British and German aircraft industries. In 1935, the General 
Staff in the War Office noted that, “The political and economic organisation of the German 
state is more favourable than our own to the adaption by industry to the production of war 
equipment of every variety”.26 
This view was endorsed by a succession of British visitors to Germany. Lord Rothermere, 
the Daily Mail proprietor who was on friendly terms with Hitler, passed on to Weir statistics 
from Göring: in 1936, Germany was apparently turning out a plane every half-hour and 80 
percent of the Luftwaffe fleet were bombers. Weir privately calculated this amounted to an 
annual output of 4700 planes – double Britain's rate. Likewise, Frederick Handley Page, the 
aircraft manufacturer, told Weir that he had toured the Junkers factories in Dessau and 
Köthen. He found it all very interesting in showing the way that Junkers was organising for 
mass production.27 A group of senior engineers from Rolls-Royce – an aero engine as well as 
luxury car manufacturer – also toured German aircraft and engine factories in 1936; so con-
cerned were they with what they saw that one of them – E.W. Hines, appointed General 
Works Manager that year – wrote to warn Swinton, Weir and Roy Fedden, from the Bristol 
Aeroplane Company.28 
In the face of these dilemmas, and perhaps also partly prompted by Weir's concerns, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence did indeed reorganise itself. A new sub-committee, known 
as the Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee, was established in late 1935. It 
comprised the leading members of the Cabinet and the service ministers. The Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, Vansittart and Fisher (respectively Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and Permanent Secretary to the Treasury) served as expert advisers. At the end of the year, 
Sir Maurice Hankey (the Cabinet Secretary) informed Weir that Baldwin not only approved 
of Weir's proposals, but was appointing him to the membership of the new committee.29 
Although Weir was a Privy Counsellor, this was a unique distinction for someone who was 
not holding one of the high offices of state.  
When this special committee first met, on January 13th 1936 at 10 Downing Street, it was 
Weir who, at Chamberlain's prompting, initiated the case for concentrating resources on air 
power. In a private letter to Weir, sent from his home in Edgbaston just before the meeting, 
Chamberlain wrote that, while he was not quite sure what the procedure was to be, “I don't 
want myself to make the main strategical point lest I should be thought to be prejudiced 
against the Army on the score of expense, and I am therefore looking to you to make the first 
step. I believe this was your intention [...].”30 
The committee met nine times in January 1936 – an indication, perhaps, of the intractable 
nature of the problems confronting British policy-makers. Vansittart and Fisher consistently 
argued the case for a continental commitment on the part of Britain – that resources should be 
allocated in order to build up a field force that could help to resist a German invasion of 
                                                          
26  The National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter TNA), WO 32/3593, ‘British and German Aircraft Indus-
tries’, note for the Committee of Imperial Defence, 29 April 1935. 
27  UG, GB0248 DC96/21/3, letters, Rothermere to Weir, 15 March 1936, and Handley Page to Weir, 8 
May 1936. 
28  I. Lloyd, Rolls-Royce. The Years of Endeavour, London 1978, p. 171. 
29  UG, GB0248 DC96/21/3, letter, Hankey to Weir, 28 Dec. 1935.  
30  Ibid., letter, Chamberlain (Westbourne, Edgbaston) to Weir, 9 Jan. 1936. 
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Western Europe. However, this ran counter to Chamberlain's strategy, which he continued to 
espouse after he succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister. Chamberlain's alternative prescription – 
to remain isolated from the continent and to deter the German threat by building up the 
strength of the Royal Navy and RAF – prevailed for much of the second-half of the 1930s.31 
British plans were based on an estimate, dating from 1931, that the requirements for aircraft 
and aero engines during the first year of a future war would be procured by adding five large 
motor car firms to the existing aircraft constructors.32 However, very quickly after taking up 
his new role of adviser in May 1935, Weir could see that even the peacetime demand for 
aero engines was likely to outstrip the means of supply. He told the Air Ministry, “The best 
expansion channel for this, if needed, should come from the automobile industry.”33 Indeed, 
by the start of 1936, the Ministry had begun to realize that the existing firms were not going 
to be able to meet the current rate of demand for aircraft – 4000 per year – and that a large 
order would have to be placed with one or more of the big motor firms. As Sir Christopher 
Bullock, the Permanent Secretary, noted, the War Office had started to draw on sources 
outside the normal armament industry and “they will have to rely on orders placed with a 
shadow supply organization for meeting an appreciable part of their deficiencies´”.34 Bullock 
could see no reason in principle – as long as there was no undue dislocation of normal 
industry – why aircraft should not be procured in the same way. 
However, one factor above all others determined the character of the shadowing of arma-
ments production in Britain: an adequate supply of the right kind of skilled and semi-skilled 
labour and management expertise. The greatest barrier to expanding the output of the aircraft 
constructors was a shortage of workers with appropriate skills. One of the firms experiencing 
these difficulties was Armstrong Siddeley in Coventry. According to one Air Ministry official, 
the firm was forced to engage in the disputatious practice of dilution – the substitution of 
semi-skilled for skilled workers – because “skilled labour is now practically unprocurable in 
Coventry”.35 Yet, paradoxically, the cause of this problem provided, at the same time, the 
means to solve it. 
This city had a long-established background as a national centre for armaments production; 
the manufacture of munitions and weapons before and during the First World War had 
already included the participation of the new motor vehicle industry in the production of 
aircraft. While the Great Depression had wiped out swathes of industry, resulting in the 
deskilling of many workers, the Birmingham-Coventry industrial axis escaped the worst 
elements of the crisis by combining technologically-advanced manufacturing with traditional 
metal-working interests. Buoyed up by the car industry, Coventry drew in waves of skilled 
                                                          
31  B.J.C. McKercher, Deterrence and the European Balance of Power. The Field Force and British Grand 
Strategy, 1934-1938, in: English Historical Review 123, 500, 2008, pp. 98-131. 
32  CAC, Weir19/5, Defence Requirements Committee Paper, DC (M)(32) 138, April 1935, ‘British and 
German Aircraft Industries’. 
33  CAC, Weir 19/2, Note on Rearmament, 11 June 1935. Weir believed that the aircraft industry was 
strong enough, at least, to construct airframes and that it wasn’t necessary to encourage large shipbuild-
ing firms, like Harland & Wolff, to enter the industry. 
34  CAC, Weir 19/1, letter, 7 Jan. 1936, Bullock (Air Ministry) to Weir, enclosing a copy of a memo to the 
Secretary of State. 
35  Ibid., letter, 12 June 1935, B.E. Holloway (Air Ministry) to Weir. 
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and ambitious workers, engineers and entrepreneurs and became the fastest-growing city in 
Britain in the interwar years. 
With aircraft production made a priority, the particular expertise in engineering and metal 
fabrication of the motor manufacturers, and the concentration of part-making firms in the 
west Midlands, once again brought this region, and Coventry in particular, to prominence in 
the re-armament effort. These factors made it the obvious choice, in 1936, as the main base 
for the shadow factory scheme. Facilities to produce airframes, and particularly aero engines, 
could be located next to the existing factories of the motor companies, in order to utilise 
relevant skills and expertise of both managements and workers. Few, if any, alternative lo-
cations recommended themselves; the only realistic answer was to locate production in or close 
to those firms able to undertake the work. The willing co-operation of the existing aircraft 
industry was also required if the scheme was to operate effectively. A key manufacturer was 
the Bristol Aeroplane Company – responsible for building the Blenheim light bomber.36 
As the scheme progressed, earnings in the Midlands shadow factories came to be among 
the highest in the engineering industry. The Air Ministry felt vulnerable over the difficulties 
in controlling the distortions in the labour market that this caused, such as the competitive 
bidding up of wages as managements were released from the constraints that would have 
operated normally. This risked alienating other employers who did not enjoy such a privi-
leged position. However, the scheme could also take advantage of the stance taken by the 
Midlands engineering firms on dilution which, in spite of the concerns of the trades unions, 
was not automatically considered an abnormal practice in the sector. Once war broke out, 
dilution was introduced rapidly on a large scale.37 
The layout and plant of the shadow factories were designed for quantity production rather 
than experimental or development work. The most important were the factories that were to 
produce the Mercury – the aero engine which powered the twin-engine Blenheim. The No.1 
group (as it came to be called) was laid down in 1937/38; as war grew, and the need to pro-
duce a greater quantity of engines became apparent, the No.2 group was established in 
1939/40. Swinton initiated the scheme when, on March 24th 1936, he wrote to the motor 
manufacturers – Austin (based at Longbridge in Birmingham), Morris (based in Cowley, 
Oxford) and Coventry-based Daimler, Rover, Rootes (in the form of its subsidiary, Hillman 
Motors), and Standard. The Singer car company in Coventry was also contacted but was to 
play a very small part in the scheme, largely because the Treasury became concerned about 
the financial stability of the firm.38 Wolseley (Morris) dropped out of the scheme but, after a 
lengthy set of negotiations between the government and the companies to agree terms and 
conditions, contracts were finally signed in November 1937. The companies appeared to secure 
much of what they wanted. They were to receive what amounted to a management fee for 
operating the plants. But they were not required to transfer productive labour, material or 
equipment from their own factories to the shadow factories. Payment would also be made to 
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the companies for work done by their technical staff in installing the machinery in the new 
factories and for all work undertaken in preparing machine tools, parts and other goods pending 
the completion of the factories.39 
The first group of shadow engine factories were built alongside or very near to their parent 
works in Coventry. Most of the land was owned by the firms and might, in any case, have 
been used at some point for extensions to the car plants. Extraordinarily, only after construc-
tion had begun were terms discussed for the sale of the sites. The price the Air Ministry was 
prepared to pay was largely determined by valuing the opportunity costs for the companies 
concerned. As Hillman Motors had little room to expand for their own purposes at their 
Humber works (where the shadow factory was to be built) and because the Ministry wished 
to avoid alienating Rootes (the parent company), Swinton settled quickly to get the scheme 
underway as speedily as possible. The price the company wanted for the land was accepted.40 
In contrast, the Ministry believed that the price sought by Daimler was grossly inflated as 
their works occupied a large site (the Radford Estate) with plenty of space to expand. A 
price – £750 per acre instead of £1500 per acre originally sought – was not agreed until 
September 1937. The land was not legally conveyed until February 1938, by which the time 
the factory was in full production.41 
Vulnerability  
German military planners had a strong interest in hiding the location and purpose of the 
shadow factories from the international public. Rearmament had begun in secret to hide 
violations of the Versailles Peace Treaty and to avoid antagonising neighbouring powers, 
and, in the early years of the Third Reich, the exact dimension of the rearmament programme 
was concealed. During the Second World War, the planners wanted to protect the shadow 
factories from air raids. To realize these objectives the Nazis used both an institutional and a 
geographical solution to hide the plants. 
As indicated, shadow factories were not run by well-known armament firms but by newly-
founded subsidiaries. These subsidiaries took the legal form of a limited liability company 
(GmbH) and so did not have to reveal the type and volume of their business in annual reports, 
as their parent companies were required to do under stock corporation law. To enhance the 
deception, existing German limited liability companies which produced civil goods, and 
which had innocuous-sounding names, were taken over by the parent company and then used 
to operate the shadow factory. The shadow factories were physically hidden by locating 
them in rural areas – often within forests – far away from the western borders of Germany 
and, consequently, beyond the range of British bombers. The big disadvantage of this approach 
was that militarily-safe locations often lacked both the infrastructure for transporting raw 
materials and finished products and the workforce needed for the plants. As a result, the 
                                                          
39  TNA, AIR 6/45, note of meeting at the Air Ministry between Swinton, Weir and the motor manufacturers, 7 
April 1936; also AIR 2/1822, note of meeting at the Air Ministry between Swinton and the manu-
facturers leading the scheme, 31 May 1937. 
40  TNA, AIR 2/2325, minute by Swinton, 16 Aug. 1936. 
41  TNA, AIR 2/2324, letter, 28 Sept.1937 from Daimler to Capt. Davies, Air Ministry; minute, 7 Feb. 
1938, by Treasury Solicitor. 
Democracy at a disadvantage?                                                                                              61 
optimal location of a shadow plant was often a compromise between strategic and economic 
considerations. 
Overesch describes the careful and pains-taking process undertaken by Robert Bosch 
GmbH in weighing up the different factors in regard to the location of its shadow factory. In 
spring 1937, General Leeb, head of the Army Weapons Office (Heereswaffenamt), asked 
Bosch (based in Stuttgart) to set up a new, army-owned factory needed to manufacture starter 
motors and dynamos for German tanks in northern Germany. Finally, from a list of not less 
than 16 different small and medium-sized German towns judged suitable as a location for  
the new factory the town, Hildesheim was selected. Hildesheim was connected both to the 
Cologne-to-Berlin railway line and to the Mittellandkanal – the major German canal linking 
the Rhine and Elbe rivers. What is more, the town promised to provide housing for the 
workforce of the new firm. To hide the new factory from aerial views it was erected within a 
near-by forest rather than within the established town. According to the building plans no 
shed was made higher than the surrounding treetops. In addition, the sites of the various 
factory buildings were both scattered and staggered to diminish the impact of any bombing 
attacks not foiled by these means of deception.42 Another example of the strategy to locate 
shadow factories in rural areas, far away from Germany’s western borders, were the eight 
shadow factories of Sprengchemie GmbH – the most important German manufacturer of 
gunpowder during the war. These works, operated by the traditional gunpowder manufacturer 
Westfälisch-Anhaltinische Sprengstoff AG (WASAG), were not concentrated in one area 
but were spread throughout the States of Bavaria and Prussia.43  
Although the isolated locations of German plants made them very difficult to spot and 
bomb from the air, one of the ironies of the pre-war years was that a great deal was known 
about some of them in Britain. In early 1935 Hitler repudiated the Versailles Treaty. Indeed, 
the frantic pace of rearmament became evident throughout the country and the growing 
strength of the Luftwaffe was even used as a propaganda weapon to cower potential ene-
mies. But one British visitor was particularly well informed: prompted by the earlier report 
from Rolls-Royce, Roy Fedden twice travelled to Germany in 1937 to tour around different 
production facilities. His reports provided British intelligence with the last accurate and 
comprehensive account during peacetime of German capabilities and organisation in aircraft 
production.44 That he was permitted such access is a reflection of how familial and close-knit 
the world of aviation was in the interwar years. Airframe design and engine technology was 
exchanged between British and German manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce, Supermarine, 
Heinkel and Messerschmitt, until the early 1930s.45 Not only did Fedden remain on friendly 
terms with German apprentices he had trained in the 1920s but, as one of the leading aircraft 
engineers of his day – he had, for example, designed and created the Mercury engine – he 
was held in high respect by aircraft manufacturers everywhere. 
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Fedden's tour included a visit to Eisenach, where BMW had a motor car plant and a shadow 
aero engine plant; while the former occupied a site in the middle of the town, the latter was 
located a mile away on the town’s outskirts. What amazed Fedden was that the shadow plant 
was invisible from anywhere in the vicinity: “Passing through the entrance gate you suddenly 
come upon the different buildings of the engine plant cunningly hidden amongst the pine trees 
on the sides of the hill”. Equally impressive was the way air raid shelters were incorporated 
into buildings, and the general layout and organisation of the plant. Operations had commenced 
in early 1936 and the 1500 workers were engaged in switching production from the Hornet – 
a Pratt and Whitney air-cooled radial engine – to a more powerful German version.46 
Whenever possible, new munitions plants in Britain were also built in locations away from 
parts of the country closest to continental Europe, even if no particular attempts were made 
to conceal them. Also considered, from 1935, were ways to induce the aircraft industry to 
transfer plants from London and surrounding district – regarded as especially vulnerable – to 
areas which were strategically safer. At the same time, as the Air Ministry ruefully admitted, 
absolute safety was becoming increasingly impossible as the range of aircraft developed.47 
In the case of shadow aero-engine factories, planners thought that they had no option but 
to concentrate the plants in just one city. Fedden, as part of a Bristol Aeroplane Company 
delegation, met with Swinton and Weir in March 1936 to discuss how to implement the shadow 
scheme – specifically, the production of Bristol engines. The Secretary of State raised a 
specific objection to the company’s plan for each of the motor firms to concentrate on just one 
component of the aero engines. He pointed out that the destruction of one firm by bombing 
would have jeopardized the entire production process, and he “did not wish to add to the 
number of cases in which this eventuality was already dangerous.”48 Yet, because Swinton 
and Weir appeared concerned to defer to the aircraft manufacturers, and because it was 
necessary to get the scheme underway, the Bristol firm’s plan was put into operation. Each of 
the motor firms concentrated on manufacturing different components, with Bristols and Austins 
undertaking the final assembly of the engines. Nevertheless, as the threat of war grew more 
menacing, the No.1 group’s vulnerability became evermore evident. Consequently, the No.2 
group was set up in a way to insure against loss by enemy bombing: the four firms involved 
were organised into two partnerships: Daimler and Standard formed one pair, while Rootes 
and Rover made up the other, with each pair manufacturing the complete engine.49 
The same arguments over the concentration of manufacturing could also be applied to situa-
tions where the sheer volume of production from a single works rendered a whole dimension 
of rearmament vulnerable. Weir argued that this was the case with the Rolls Royce aero 
engine plant in Derby and that, consequently, a shadow factory located elsewhere (but operated 
by Rolls Royce) was justified.50 The Derby plant produced Merlin aero engines for the Hurri-
cane, Hawker’s single-seat fighter aircraft. But the Merlin also powered the Supermarine 
Company’s Spitfire. By early 1938, the Air Ministry, believing that the Spitfire showed consid-
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erable potential, had decided to schedule large-scale production of the plane. Similarly, when 
deciding on additional airframe shadow-capacity at the end of 1937, Swinton ruled that the 
factories had to be located in safe areas since there could be no excuse for spending public 
money in establishing them in vulnerable areas.51 
Thus, the British government recognised, albeit implicitly, that basing the shadow aero en-
gine scheme in one major centre would risk turning it into a primary target for the enemy. 
Herein lay something of a strategic gamble: that the benefits of harnessing the motor industry – 
the creation of a vastly-expanded bomber force which would act as a deterrent – would mean 
the likely costs resulting from enemy action would never have to be faced. It was a gamble 
which was not, of course, to pay off: Hitler was not deterred and the costs – the devastation 
of Coventry – turned out to be unimaginably high. 
What appeared to be the right industrial decision for Britain in the late 1930s – to cluster a 
high proportion of strategically-vital production in a confined, urban area – seemed sheer folly 
as the war progressed. Allied fortunes suffered a disastrous reversal with the Fall of France. 
In planning air-raid protection, the Coventry authorities seemed to recognize that the shadow 
factory workforce and the general population were equally vulnerable. Certainly, the Standard 
and Daimler works were among the armaments factories specifically targeted by the Luftwaffe 
on the night of the Coventry blitz (November 13th/14th 1940). Daimler's No. 1 factory in Rad-
ford was singled out for particular punishment – it was hit by an estimated 150 HE bombs 
and 3000 incendiaries. However, during the eleven hours the raid lasted, 43,000 homes were 
destroyed or badly damaged and 554 people killed across the city as a whole. In its intensity, 
the raid was without precedent. It is not the case that the city's defences had been neglected: 
with over 40 anti-aircraft guns in action, Coventry was as well protected as anywhere in Britain 
at that stage of the war. But, the vagaries of ground gun-control, and the inability to deploy 
radar-equipped night fighters, allowed all but one of the German raiders to escape unharmed.52 
With much of Daimler's factory severely damaged, the Air Supply Board discussed measures 
for the dispersal of production.53 Consequently, the big raid, and another destructive one in 
April 1941, interrupted the policy of localisation; a limited number of shadow factory units 
and departments were dispersed to minor industrial centres and rural areas. It is difficult to 
quantify production losses at Coventry's shadow factories as a result of the bombing, but 
stoppages proved to be temporary. Repairs to the infrastructure (under the leadership of 
William Rootes) were made a priority. Moreover, as the bombing of Germany later confirmed, 
factory machine tools were difficult to destroy and could be repaired. Similarly, pessimistic 
predictions in the immediate aftermath of the 1940 raid were not realised: civilian morale did 
not collapse. Nonetheless, some people did leave the city, making available undamaged 
accommodation for the shadow factory workforce. This allowed the authorities to continue a 
process of voluntary billeting – much as the government had urged. In addition, by 1943 the 
Ministry of Labour had built 16 hostels with 8,000 places for workers in Coventry and 
south-east Birmingham.54 The city therefore remained a key centre for the war effort. 
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The local population 
In sharp contrast to how the scheme was structured in Britain, the German shadow factories 
were not located in established industrialised centres but in rural, under-developed areas. 
The German decision to hide the shadow factories in rural regions obviously had the not 
unwanted side-effect of diminishing any local opposition to these investment projects. In-
deed, resistance against the establishment of the new armament firms was apparently rather 
rare. In the case of Robert Bosch’s planned shadow factory in northern Germany, the towns 
under consideration to host the new firm competed with each other for this investment, finally 
made in Hildesheim. This is illustrated by the way the chairman of the regional council in 
Hannover complained bitterly about the fact that Bosch had not supported the proposal by 
Seelz – one of Hannover’s suburbs – even though a rapid supply of both additional housing 
and cultural entertainment for the new workforce had been promised.55 
In similar fashion, the local authorities of Britain’s so-called Special and Depressed Areas 
engaged in intense lobbying to secure rearmament-based jobs for their regions rather than 
for the prosperous southern half of Britain. So many requests were received that an inter-
departmental committee was set up, in 1937, to examine the issues around the location of 
new munitions factories. The government felt compelled to declare that its policy was to 
establish such factories in depressed areas, as far as practical considerations permitted.56 But 
the variety of responses by local people to proposals to build shadow factories reveals a curious 
paradox. In principle, building a new factory meant a welcome increase in employment  
opportunities within a region; in practice, the precise sites selected for the new factories  
frequently stirred up a great deal of local controversy, even anger. 
In order to achieve anything like the number of Spitfires that was required, production had 
to be switched from other types already being constructed by different aircraft companies 
and shadow capacity added to those and other companies. Initially, a site in Shrewsbury was 
chosen for Rolls-Royce’s Merlin shadow factory. But the Ministry of Labour protested that 
the factory should, instead, be located in an area where there was unemployed labour. As a 
result, a site in Crewe was acquired.57 Another centre selected for Spitfire production was 
Stockport, Lancashire – the manufacturing-base of the Fairey Aviation Company. The region 
was both a depressed one and farther away from an enemy’s bombers than many parts of 
Britain. However, there then followed a protracted dispute over where to put the shadow 
factory and, once a site was chosen (some redundant works adjacent to Fairey’s existing 
factory), how much land to acquire and whether it should be compulsorily purchased.58 This 
district bordered a purely residential area, and preserving the latter’s amenities suddenly 
became a major concern of the Stockport authorities. Chief among these amenities was the 
Heaton Moor Golf Club. The Ministry's Lands Officer visited Stockport in November 1938 
and reported that the Golf Club's secretary was “very much disturbed at the prospect of the 
greens and tees being taken away”. Fortunately, Stockport’s Town Clerk was a club member 
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and was asked by the Ministry representative to offer all necessary reassurances to the club 
committee.59 
Because the shadow factories built in Coventry under the No.1 scheme were co-located 
with existing motor vehicle plants, the local authorities raised no objection over the sites and 
generally supported the scheme. Similarly, the level of local complaints during peacetime 
was muted in comparison to the protests accompanying the second phase of the shadow 
scheme from 1939.60 Daimler's management wanted to develop its No.2 factory away from 
the city, but was instructed to build the plant within five miles of Standard's new Banner 
Lane works. The site selected was adjacent to Browns Lane in Allesley, a district on the 
outskirts of Coventry. In late June 1939, the local ratepayers and residents association ob-
jected strongly. The city surveyor had reassured them that the district was scheduled exclu-
sively for housing; overturning this, they alleged, would be a grave breach of faith as many 
other, more suitable sites existed.61 However, given the intention to concentrate production in 
order to exploit the benefits of industrial clustering, the choice of available sites was limited. 
The Council was itself upset, arguing that ordered planning – the objective of the interwar 
Town Planning Act – was being thwarted and even made ridiculous by the flagrant disregard 
of local authorities. The impact of the shadow factory scheme raised the same issues in dif-
ferent parts of Britain and led to the same kinds of protest. The Crown was not bound by the 
Act and, therefore, councils had no effective, legal means of complaint or appeal.62 Coventry 
councillors told the local Members of Parliament that they understood the “national necessi-
ties”, but that a complete lack of consultation had resulted in a choice of sites that was “hap-
hazard” and threatened the establishment of the “green belt”. Coventry had pioneered this 
novel principle in planning future growth – preventing urban sprawl by preserving rural 
areas around built-up districts.63 This now seemed to have been a waste of time and money. 
Building and operating the two factories involved large-scale capital projects; a new infra-
structure of utility supply networks and systems, together with road construction and wid-
ening, were all soon to have a major impact. The council urged the government to set up 
effective administrative machinery to avoid a recurrence of actions that were “so contrary to 
the general public interest”.64 Ironically, the destruction caused by bombing gave town plan-
ners opportunities to redesign an urban environment on a scale scarcely conceivable before 
1940. As a result, a modernised city centre was to emerge after the war.65 
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Rather curiously, the outbreak of war did not force a re-definition of this view of the public 
interest; if anything, the obvious need to step up the pace of rearmament heightened local 
concerns. In October and November 1939, directors of both Standard and Rootes wrote to the 
council over the slow progress of housing development. Rootes were rapidly constructing 
their No.2 aero engine factory at Ryton. This lay just outside of the city to the south, but it 
depended on Coventry for most of its facilities and amenities. The factory was expected to 
employ between 4,000 and 5,000 workers. But construction of a large housing-estate adjacent 
to the factory had been halted and Rootes were naturally anxious over how they were going 
to accommodate their employees.66 
Whilst the Air Ministry regretted the way the scheme had been imposed, it offered no so-
lutions to the problems. The council believed that a “vast army of additional workpeople” 
was about to descend on the city. The Engineering Employers' Federation estimated an addi-
tional 35,000 workers and 15,000 dependents would migrate to the city in 1940, suddenly 
swelling the total population from 240,000 to almost 300,000. There was neither anywhere 
to house these workers nor to attend to their health or educational needs. The Ministry of 
Health refused to allow permission for an expanded house-building programme, encom-
passing some 5,000 new houses, because of raw-material shortages. Deploring the apparent 
absence of any constructive thought by government, the council feared the problem of how 
to finance the infrastructure required to meet such a rapid expansion in industrial activity put 
the whole future of the city at stake. Worse still, it was assumed that when armament pro-
duction ceased at the war's end, the unemployed workers would have to be supported by 
public assistance.67 The faith expressed in an eventual successful outcome to the conflict was 
clearly tinged with unhappy memories of the recession that followed the First World War. 
At the beginning of 1940, Walter Elliot, Minister of Health, and representatives from relevant 
Ministries met Strickland, the city's MP, and leading councillors. The Minister remained 
unmoved by the deputation's lobbying. He urged the council to make better use of existing, 
empty houses and the opportunities for lodging. He pointed out that the City, itself, had 
asked to be made an “evacuable” area: hundreds of children and other evacuees were being 
provided for voluntarily, and without resort to compulsory powers under the Defence Regu-
lations, by the inhabitants of surrounding, rural areas. Elliot challenged Coventry's citizens to 
demonstrate an equal desire to help – by offering accommodation – in work of national im-
portance, whatever the inconvenience and hardship it might cause.68 
The disputes between local and central government remained unresolved even as Britain 
faced, by March 1940, what was euphemistically called the national emergency. Although 
the government had undertaken to cover all of the costs of new roads required for the 
shadow factories, the financing arrangements for improving existing roads had been left 
undecided. The council offered to pay for air-raid shelters, including ones to accommodate the 
shadow factory workforce, if the government would pay for most of the road improvements; 
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the councillors claimed that “it will be an advantage for the Government and the local 
authority to work in friendly co-operation.”69 
Knowledge transfer 
Decision-makers in both Britain and Germany recoiled from the idea of state-run armament 
firms. Instead, shadow factories were financed and leased to private enterprise because this 
procedure was the most promising way to make use of the know-how of established manu-
facturers who knew better than state administrators how to set up and operate these factories. 
In Nazi Germany, the new shadow factories were often placed hundreds of kilometres away 
from the traditional location of a particular armament manufacturer. It seems likely that the 
wide geographical distances between parent company and new subsidiary made knowledge 
transfer difficult. In the case of Robert Bosch’s shadow factory in Hildesheim, for example, 
managers had to deal with the problem that the local workforce did not reflect the level of 
human capital that was needed for the demanding production of starters and dynamos. As a 
result, Bosch sent master craftsmen from the parent company in Stuttgart to Hildesheim to 
train unskilled workers – the only ones who were available. This training programme, set up 
more than one year before production actually commenced was, apparently, made more 
difficult by the differences in culture, religion and dialect between instructors and trainees.70 
Similarly, Scherner and Streb have attempted to evaluate the extent of knowledge transfer 
between the different works of Sprengchemie by comparing their respective labour produc-
tivities. In theory, managers of a well-established factory should have learnt, while running the 
works, how to increase labour productivity by technological and organisational improve-
ments; this additional knowledge, it is assumed, would have been communicated to the man-
agement of a newly-founded factory, thereby obviating any need for learning-by-doing. At 
first glance, knowledge transfer within Sprengchemie was indeed successful: labour productiv-
ity at the newly-founded factories was nearly as high as that, in the same year, for the actual 
productivity leader which had been practising learning-by-doing for several years. But, the 
capital endowment of Sprengchemie's newer works was, in general, considerably higher than 
that of the older works and, when this is taken into consideration, there would appear to be little 
evidence of successful knowledge transfer between the firm’s different factories.71 
Naturally, care must be taken in interpreting such results: whilst they might reveal that 
knowledge transfer from factory to factory was difficult, they do not prove that the difficulties 
increased with geographical distance. However, it is possible to reach a tentative conclusion 
here that the strategy of dispersing German shadow factories across the eastern hinterland 
might have come with the price that knowledge transfer was made more difficult than was 
the case in Britain. If geographical distance did in fact impede inter-factory knowledge 
transfer, the decision to locate shadow factories far away from the parent company rather 
than in the immediate neighbourhood would have led, ceteris paribus, to a comparative dis-
advantage for Germany in the arms race with Britain. 
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In Britain, parts of the aircraft industry were bitterly opposed to the idea as a whole of shadow 
production based around the vehicle manufacturers. In late 1934, Rolls-Royce argued that it 
would be better to invest in its factory in Derby in order to equip facilities for finishing and 
assembling additional parts produced by sub-contractors. In the years that followed, Rolls 
Royce maintained this view of how the country’s productive capacity could be most rapidly 
and effectively increased. When the first shadow factories were built, Rolls-Royce admitted 
that the facilities were modern but claimed that there was no technical organisation to 
support them and that they relied entirely on the parent aircraft firm for all the creative skills 
in relation to design, materials and production methods. Similarly, the Society of British 
Aircraft Constructors was also hostile to the shadow scheme: car manufacturers, they pointed 
out, produced standardised goods and therefore lacked the necessary flexibility to accommodate 
frequent modifications in design inherent in aircraft construction. There was, no doubt, a 
considerable element of special pleading in this criticism. The aircraft industry had a vested 
interest in securing continuation orders for existing aircraft types which they assumed would 
be a more profitable enterprise than developing new models.72 
To facilitate knowledge transfer between the parent motor company and the shadow factory, 
Britain mostly chose – as in the case of aircraft production in Coventry – to locate the latter 
directly in the neighbourhood of the former. The intention was to bring about external 
economies in production. It was assumed – not unreasonably for as long as Britain remained 
at peace – that the parent company's skilled workers and managers would be able to train a 
greatly expanded workforce coming into the shadow factory to the required high level of 
efficiency. The large number of ancillary firms in the region would help to facilitate the new 
production processes. A study completed towards the end of the Second World War con-
cluded that the dominant factor in the shadow factory plan had been the attempt to benefit 
from the economy of large-scale organisation as distinct from that of large-scale production. 
In other words, the aim was to make the best use of Coventry's exceptionally able, higher 
management – an economy of entrepreneurship.73 
As indicated above, in organising how the technology should be transferred from the aircraft 
companies and set up in the new plants, the No.1 scheme went ahead on the basis of an 
exceptional level of sub-division, in spite of Swinton’s reservations and even though some of 
the firms themselves seemed interested in manufacturing complete engines. The official 
historian characterised the scheme as, “an outstanding venture into a group organisation for 
shadow industry development”.74 The intention was for Bristols to educate the firms in the 
manufacture of relevant components, to avoid duplication, and to introduce variations in 
design as necessary. This arrangement, it was said, would be less disruptive to the firms' 
normal activities. Weir disagreed because he thought there was no time for such a plan.75 He 
may have been right. The No.2 scheme was structured differently not just because of the 
question of vulnerability but also because a significant element of learning-by-doing emerged 
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from the experience of the No.1 group. The similarity between aero and motor vehicle engine 
manufacture was over-estimated: it had been assumed that the manufacture of the one could 
be substituted by the other just by replacing certain items of plant. By 1938, it had become 
clear that this was not the case, and that a fundamental replacement of plant was required.76 
Among the motor manufacturers, Standard adapted easily to the close tolerances, design 
changes and complex co-ordination tasks required for aircraft production, but the experience 
of the other big vehicle producers proved to be much less satisfactory.77 
If the aspirations for the shadow scheme proved difficult to realise before the war, they 
were especially challenging under wartime conditions that brought not only destruction but 
also raw material shortages and decision-making that was both arbitrary and increasingly 
centralised. As a result, shadow factory productivity up to 1942 appears to have been in line 
with the poor performance of the aircraft industry as a whole.78 The development of the 
shadow scheme in Coventry had drawn in many workers from depressed regions, such as 
mining areas in south Wales, where loyalties to trade unionism were deep-rooted. Parts of 
the workforce appeared intent on exploiting opportunities presented by the expansionary 
conditions at the outset of the war: Rootes, for example, complained to the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation about disruption in the polishing shop at its No.1 factory adjacent to 
the Humber Works.79 By May 1942, the position was causing the British government great 
concern. Jay Llewellin (Minister of Aircraft Production) admitted to Sir Andrew Duncan 
(Minister of Supply) that the excessive wage rates being paid in Coventry’s shadow factories 
both hindered production and threatened the structure of wages – particularly the fixing of 
rates – in factories elsewhere in the country. Llewellin complained that, “It is increasingly 
evident that the ordinary industrial negotiating machinery is powerless to remedy a situation 
such as has developed there.”80  
Conclusions 
In this essay it has been suggested that to understand the similarities and differences between 
the war economies of Second World War combatants it is necessary to look, first, at the 
underlying economic problems all countries had to deal with, and, secondly, at the particular 
national solutions each country found for these problems. Applying this analytical approach 
to the history of shadow factories in Britain and Germany yields some surprising results. 
Despite diverging ideological and political systems, the governments in both countries 
shared a common goal to build up additional capacity for producing armament goods before 
the outbreak of war. Their common problem was that the relevant private firms in both 
countries judged an investment in additional or new armament factories as very risky and 
unprofitable in the longer run; consequently, they declined to use their own funds for these 
investment projects. Given a choice between establishing either state-run shadow factories, 
or state-funded shadow factories operated by private operators under a lease or agency 
agreement, both governments opted for the second solution. This decision was driven by the 
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belief, again shared by both governments, that in contrast to the state, the traditional arma-
ment and vehicle manufacturers, rather than the state, had the technological know-how to 
commission and operate these new factories. 
By mostly locating shadow factories far away from traditional industrial centres, Germany’s 
policy on shadow production contrasted with Britain’s approach, at least before the outbreak 
of war. British policy led, of course, to advantages and disadvantages that were diametrically 
opposite to the German ones. The German solution had two, main advantages: first, the shadow 
factories could be hidden in rural areas, or even forests, reducing their vulnerability to attack 
from French and British bombers; secondly, the local authorities welcomed rather than opposed 
the investment, which often promised to take the form of a modernisation programme for their 
underdeveloped regions. There was, however, a major shortcoming in the German strategy: the 
large geographical distance between parent company and new subsidiary, as well as the 
insufficient supply of skilled workers in rural regions, might have impeded knowledge transfer 
and, in turn, reduced labour productivity in shadow factories in comparison to the armament 
manufacturers' established works. 
Despite the differences in the British and German shadow schemes, the fundamental solu-
tion to the underlying economic problem – how to utilise the know-how of private armament 
and other manufacturers who were unwilling to invest – was the same in both countries. 
Armaments policy was driven less by ideological objectives and rather more by economic 
exigencies. In a broader perspective, the task of preparing to fight a material-intensive mod-
ern war, such as the Second World War, may have led to very similar, national solutions for 
internationally shared, economic problems. 
Nevertheless, the part played by ideological factors in determining how successful Britain 
and Germany were in implementing the respective schemes was far from insignificant. In 
setting out to create an effective, British compromise solution, Lord Weir may have achieved 
his objective: a detailed analysis of the shadow factory scheme suggests that, by the end of 
the 1930s, Britain’s progress in preparing for war was both rapid and extensive. At the same 
time, Weir’s hopes that in producing armaments a democracy ought to have been able to 
compete on equal terms with a dictatorship were severely tested. A democracy, by its very 
nature, provides mechanisms for the representation and reconciliation of a diversity of inter-
ests. The peacetime British state was not politically disposed to intervene in industry, or to 
direct labour, or to acquire land for factory construction by exercising compulsory powers. 
In making Bristol aero engines the priority for shadow production, Britain’s new factories 
were placed in the immediate geographical neighbourhood of the parent motor company. But 
the planning and execution of this policy was carried out only after the interests of the rele-
vant aircraft manufacturer had been taken into account and after frequently lengthy and 
tortuous negotiations had been undertaken with the motor companies. 
The coming of war demanded a vast increase in productive capacity and Britain’s shadow 
factory scheme was expanded accordingly. Yet, under the conditions of the phoney war, local 
authorities continued to guard jealously their rights related to local autonomy and account-
ability; this added a layer of complexity to decision-making and acted to retard the progress 
of the scheme. There was no sense that Britain's potentially dire geo-strategic predicament 
required drastic remedies. However much the British public supported the central govern-
ment in an unified effort to engage in fighting a long conflict, local interests did not always 
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sit easily with the more immediate dictates and demands of the war. The constraints and 
limitations imposed by democracy on the mobilisation of resources put the British state at a 
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ideological objectives and far more by economic exigencies. However, this essay examines how a 
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Keywords: Britain, Germany, Second World War, Democracy, Rearmament, Shadow Factories 
JEL-Codes: N, L 52, N 44, N6 4 
Neil Forbes is Professor of International History and Director of Research at Coventry University, UK. 
His research interests focus on the history of international, political and economic relations in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He specialises in the study of the inter-war years. He has published 
widely on the processes of financial stabilisation in Europe after 1918, Anglo-American relations and 
the rise of the Third Reich, and the interaction of foreign policy formulation and diplomacy with the 
commercial operations of multinational enterprise, banks and other business and financial actors. His 
research interests also include studying the impact of the World Wars in Europe in relation to conflict 
heritage, contested landscapes and memorialisation. He has played a leading role in both UK and EU 




Coventry CV1 5FB 
UK 
lsx143@coventry.ac.uk 
